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ABSTRACT
We evaluate the effects of state-provided financial incentives for biotech companies, which are
part of a growing trend of placed-based policies designed to spur innovation clusters. We estimate that the
adoption of subsidies for biotech employers by a state raises the number of star biotech scientists in that
state by about 15 percent over a three-year period. A 10 percent decline in the user cost of capital induced
by an increase in R&D tax incentives raises the number of stars by 22 percent. Most of the gains are due
to the relocation of star scientists to adopting states, with limited effect on the productivity of incumbent
scientists already in the state. The gains are concentrated among private sector inventors. We uncover
little effect of subsidies on academic researchers, consistent with the fact that their incentives are
unaffected. Our estimates indicate that the effect on overall employment in the biotech sector is of
comparable magnitude to that of star scientists. Consistent with a model where workers are fairly mobile
across states, we find limited effects on salaries in the industry. We uncover large effects on employment
in the nontraded sector due to a sizable multiplier effect, with the largest impact on employment in
construction and retail. Finally, we find mixed evidence of a displacement effect on states that are
geographically close, or states that are economically close as measured by migration flows.
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There is growing empirical evidence that agglomeration of economic activity generates
significant economies of scale at the local level. This evidence raises both normative questions,
concerning whether government intervention is socially optimal from a national or global
perspective, and positive questions about whether such intervention, even if desirable, is
effective. Can firms’ location decisions be influenced by government incentives and, if so,
should national or local governments provide incentives to firms to cluster in particular
locations?
These questions have led to increased interest among economists in the effect of placebased economic policies. Place-based economic policies are development strategies intended to
foster economic activity in a city or a region. These policies are widespread both in the United
States and in the rest of the world. 1 Indeed, it is rare for a large production or research facility to
open today in the United States without the provision of some form of subsidy from the relevant
local government (Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti 2010; Greenstone and Moretti 2004).
An increasingly common type of place-based policy is a state-provided subsidy for “hightech” and life-science firms designed to spur innovation-based clusters. Urban economists have
long suspected that innovative industries like high-tech and life-science are characterized by
significant localized agglomeration economies. For example, the distribution of the
biotechnology industry is heavily clustered spatially, with a large fraction of the industry
employment concentrated in Boston/Cambridge, the San Francisco Bay area, San Diego, New
Jersey, Raleigh-Durham, and the Washington, DC, area. This concentration is consistent with the
existence of strong localized agglomeration externalities. 2
Because local governments often aim to create and foster self-sustaining clusters of lifescience research, a growing number of them have introduced incentives that specifically target
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the biotech industry. As of 2010, 11 states provide some type of incentive for biotech firms, and
their generosity appears to be growing. In addition, over the past two decades, general R&D tax
credits offered by U.S. states have become increasingly important. These credits are not specific
to biotech, but given the importance of R&D for the industry they are likely to disproportionally
benefit the biotech sector. As of 2010, 34 states provide a broad-based tax credit on R&D, and
the average effective credit rate has grown approximately fourfold over this period to equal half
the value of the federal effective credit rate. In many states, the state tax credit is considerably
more generous than the federal credit (Wilson 2009).
Yet, despite the growing importance of these incentives, their effects are not well
understood. 3 In this paper, we investigate the effects of state-provided biotech incentives on the
local biotech industry and the broader state economy. We construct a rich state-level panel data
set combining data on biotech-specific incentives and general R&D tax credits with data on
various outcomes measuring biotech activity in a given state and year. Our outcome measures
consist of the number of “star scientists” (defined below), employment, wages, establishments
and patents—each specific to the biotech sector—for the period 1990–2010. We also estimate
models where the outcome variables measure employment in the nontraded sector outside
biotech. Using this data set, we identify the effect of biotech incentives and the R&D user cost
off of the variation within each state over time.
We find significant effects both of the biotech-specific subsidies and the general R&D
tax credits on biotech star scientists, defined as those patenters whose patent count over the
previous 10 years is in the top 5 percent of patenters nationally. 4 The adoption of biotech
subsidies raises the number of star scientists in a state by 15 percent relative to states’ preadoption baseline. This is important because of the existing evidence on the important role
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played by the localization of star scientists on the localization and survival of U.S. biotech
clusters (Zucker, Darby, and Brewer 1998).
Notably, most of the gains in star scientists are due to the relocation of star scientists to
adopting states, with limited effect on the prolificacy of incumbent scientists already in the state.
In addition, we find that the gains are concentrated among private sector inventors, both
corporate and individual. We uncover little effects of subsidies on academic researchers,
consistent with the fact that incentives for universities—which are mostly nonprofit—are
unaffected by the subsidies.
The effect of incentives on employment is not limited to top scientists, but it extends to
other parts of the biotech workforce. We uncover significant effects on total employment in the
Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing industry (16 percent gain); the Pharmaceutical
Preparation Manufacturing industry (31 percent gain); and the scientific R&D industry (18
percent gain). Because the effect for all workers is generally similar to the effect for stars, we
infer that the incentives do not alter the ratio of stars in the workforce. 5
Consistent with a model where workers are fairly mobile across states, we find limited
effects on average salaries in these three industries. While we do not have a direct measure of
start-up creation, we find that the number of biotech-related establishments also increases
following incentive adoption. On the other hand, we find limited effects on patents following the
subsidy, possibly because it takes time for biotech research to come to fruition.
We cannot rule out the possibility that the adoption of subsidies is correlated with
unobserved trends in the vitality of the local economy in general or the local innovation sector in
particular. However, we fail to find an effect of biotech subsidies and R&D credits on
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employment in fields different from biotech. Triple difference models that include other sectors
largely confirm our estimates for the employment effects.
Consistent with the presence of a local employment multiplier effect (Moretti 2011), we
do uncover an indirect effect on the local nontraded sector, including retail, construction, and
real estate. It appears that by increasing employment in biotech, the incentives indirectly increase
employment in local services, like construction and retail, whose demand reflect the strength of
the local economy.
In additional specifications, we test whether the provision of biotech-specific tax credits
increases biotech employment at the expense of nearby states. We find mixed evidence of an
effect on states that are geographically close, or states that are economically close as measured
by worker migratory flows. If there is displacement, it is likely to be national in scope.
Finally, we provide some partial, illustrative, and indirect evidence on whether there is a
first-mover advantage in providing incentives. In the presence of agglomeration economies and
large fixed costs, the initially positive effect of the subsidy on the biotech industry of an early
adopting state should be long lasting, as biotech activity keeps agglomerating in the state even
after other states have matched the subsidy. On the other hand, in the absence of significant
agglomeration economies and large fixed costs, the initially positive effect experienced by an
early adopter will not last after competing away any relative advantage. In this case, local
biotech activity will revert to the long-run equilibrium level that existed before the provision of
any subsidies. Empirically, we find limited evidence of a first-mover advantage for biotech
incentives, although data limitations preclude us from drawing definitive conclusions.
In terms of policy implications, it is important to keep in mind that our finding that
biotech subsidies are successful at attracting star scientists and at raising local biotech
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employment do not imply that biotech subsidies are a good use of taxpayer money. Finding that
the provision of tax incentives by a state results in an increase in biotech R&D activity in that
state does not necessarily suggests the existence of a market failure, nor does it imply that the
provision of tax incentives is an efficient use of public funds. In this paper we have little to
contribute to the question of local efficiency of place based policies. Efficiency of these policies
from the point of view of the nation as a whole is even harder to address and is outside the scope
of this paper. 6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our
data and the incentives available for biotech companies. We then discuss the possible
mechanisms through which incentives can affect a state economy and present the econometric
models used. The empirical results of the paper are in the following section, and the final section
concludes.

DATA
We investigate the effects of biotech and R&D incentives on a number of different
measures of economic activity in the biotech sector. The data set used in this paper is obtained
from combining several separate data sources. In this section we describe the data sources used
and provide descriptive statistics.
Incentives
We focus our analysis on two types of state-specific incentives for innovation: R&D tax
credits and biotech-specific subsidies. The former subsidize any form of investment in R&D, not
just biotech. But given the disproportionate importance that R&D costs have for biotech, it is
obviously an important cost shifter for firms in the industry. To quantify the magnitude of R&D
5

tax incentives offered by states in our sample, we treat R&D as an input into a firm’s production
function, whose price is the implicit rental rate, or user cost, after taxes. Extending the standard
Hall-Jorgenson (1969) formula for the user cost of capital to incorporate tax and subsidies—and
ignoring federal taxes just for the exposition—yields the following formula for the user cost of
R&D capital (per dollar of investment):

User Cost of R&D = (rt + δ) [ (1 − skst − ztst) / (1 − tst) ]

where rt is the real interest rate in the economy, assumed to be the same for all states in any
given year; δ is the economic depreciation rate of R&D capital, assumed to be the same for all
firms; tst and kst are the corporate income tax rate and the R&D tax credit rate in a given state and
year; s is the share of R&D expenditures that qualify for the credit according to the tax code, set
equal to 0.5 based on IRS Statistics; and z denotes the present discounted value of tax
depreciation allowances. The formula provides a comprehensive measure of the tax advantage
provided by each state in each year that is comparable across jurisdictions and periods. We use
data from Wilson (2009), updated through 2010, to compute the relevant user cost of capital for
each state and year in our sample.
In addition to generic R&D tax credits, states have adopted a variety of specific fiscal
incentives to attract biotech activity to their jurisdiction. These incentives take various forms,
including tax credits on investment or job creation, sales and use tax exemptions, low-interest
start-up loans, and even grants. In total, 11 states have some form of incentive targeted primarily
at the biotech sector. Appendix Table 1 provides the list of adopting states and details on each
state’s program. 7
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One major limitation of our data is that, unlike R&D tax credits, it is difficult to devise a
comparable measure of the generosity of the biotech incentives, due to the heterogeneity in their
forms. For instance, Massachusetts adopted in 2009 a “Life Sciences Tax Incentive Program”
consisting of an investment tax credit, special sales tax exemptions, and a refundable research tax
credit, all applicable only for companies in life sciences. Constructing a single summary measure
of the value of this program that could be compared with another state, which might have only
one of these three tax incentives (though it could be especially generous) or might have another
type of incentive altogether (such as low interest loans as in North Carolina or research grants as
in California), is next to impossible. In principle, one could construct a proxy for the effective
credit rate by taking the ratio of the total amount spent by each state for “tax expenditures” and
grant outlays divided by the biotech sector revenues in the state. However, states do not typically
report how much they spend on incentives separately from other items in their budget. After a
comprehensive search, we were unable to find systematic data for a significant number of states.
Thus, in our empirical analysis, we simply use an indicator for the adoption of biotech
incentives. The coefficient on this indicator has to be interpreted as the mean effect of adoption,
averaged across all adopting states.
Biotech Star Scientists
We use data on biotech patents to identify the location of prolific biotech scientists and to
measure biotech innovation in a state. We purchased a proprietary data set on biotech patents
from IFI Claims Patent Services, a company that provides data services associated with
biotechnology and related fields. IFI’s specialists, who have expertise in chemistry and biology,
go through public individual patent records (from U.S. Patent and Trademark Office [USPTO])
and identify all patents that involve advances in the biotech field. This identification is necessary
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because the technology classes that the USPTO assigns to patents (which change only
infrequently and hence often cannot keep up with emerging technologies) do not map well to
biotech, which is at the intersection of a number of technological fields. Analyses of the biotech
sector based on USPTO technology classes, as the previous literature has relied on, are likely to
have difficulty cleanly identifying effects on biotech patenting given this poor mapping. To our
knowledge, this paper is the first to use the IFI database or any other data specifically focused on
identifying biotech patents.
The IFI’s patent database contains five variables for each (IFI-identified) biotech patent
from 1976–2010: year, inventor name, inventor city, inventor state, and USPTO patent ID
number. A single patent may have multiple inventors and hence multiple observations in this
data set. From these data, we construct three variables at the state-by-year level: 1) patent counts,
2) number of “star” scientists patenting in the state, and 3) number of star scientists that are new
to the state in that year. The latter variable, the number of new star scientists, is the sum of an
extensive margin—star scientists who were patenting in a different state in the previous year—
and an intensive margin—star scientists who were in the previous year in the same state but were
not “stars” (as defined below). In some specifications, we will analyze the effect of incentives on
each margin separately.
For constructing patent counts by state-year, if the patent has multiple inventors from
multiple states, we assign fractions of the patent to each of its inventors’ states in proportion to
the number of inventors of that patent in each state. For example, if a patent has four inventors,
one from California, one from Oregon, and two from Washington, we would give a patent count
of 0.25 to California, 0.25 to Oregon, and 0.50 to Washington. After constructing patent counts
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for each inventor*patent-ID observation in this way, we then simply sum biotech patent counts
by state*year.
We define “star” biotech inventors, in a given year, as those that are at or above the 95th
percentile in number of biotech patents over the past 10 years. In other words, stars are
exceptionally prolific patenters in the biotech field. The 95th cutoff is of course arbitrary, but our
empirical results are not sensitive to it. We have also estimated our regressions based on star
measures using the 90th or 99th percentiles and obtained similar results. Stars in a given year are
assigned to a single state (even if they have listed different states on different patents)
corresponding to the state in which they have the most patents (in that year). 8
The IFI database includes inventor names and distinguishes between individual and
institutional (corporations, research institutions, and universities) inventors by listing names for
the latter in all uppercase. Furthermore, it is possible to separate institutions into universities and
other institutions (mainly corporations) by classifying patenters with the word “university” or
“college” in their name as universities. We exploit this information to measure state-year counts
of patents, stars, and new stars separately for individuals, universities, and other (nonuniversity)
institutions.
Employment, Wages, and Establishments
In addition to these measures of biotech innovation, we look at biotech sector
employment, wages, and number of establishments. While our patent data allow an exact
identification of biotech patents, the same is not true for labor market and establishment data.
First, NAICS does not directly and exactly identify the biotech industry, including both the R&D
side and the production and sales side. Second, and more importantly, for years before 1998, SIC
codes were used, and the link with biotech is even more imperfect. In practice, we consider three
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different NAICS industries as potentially reflecting biotech activity: Pharmaceutical and
Medicine Manufacturing (NAICS 3254), Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing (NAICS
325412—a subset of 3254), Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life
Sciences (NAICS 54171). 9 None of these three sectors perfectly captures the biotech industry, as
each of them excludes parts of biotech and includes parts of other industries that do not belong to
biotech. But we hope that taken together, the three sectors may prove informative about the
industry. We also note that in our analysis, employment, salaries and number of establishments
are used as dependent variables. Well-behaved measurement error in the dependent variable of
linear models increases standard errors, but does not introduce any systematic bias in the
estimates.
We obtain employment data by month, industry, and state from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Census of Employment and Wages (CEW) series, and aggregate to a yearly frequency.
These data are based on administrative records (state Unemployment Insurance payroll reports)
so they contain minimal measurement error. They cover all employers, with no minimum
thresholds for employer size. We obtain data on wages and number of establishments by month
and state from the Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) data series, and aggregate
to a yearly frequency. Both the CEW and CBP data contain missing (nondisclosed) values for
some state-years when disclosure of such values could potentially be used to identify specific
employers. For our regressions, we construct balanced panels for each dependent variable by
dropping states that do not have complete time series for that variable.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows summary statistics. Panel A shows the means of our variables. Columns
1–3 and 7–8 show the means in levels (which we use in the regressions) and columns 4–6 show
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the means in per capita terms. The means are calculated over our total sample. Columns 1–4
report means across all states; columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 split the sample between states that adopt
biotech incentives and those that do not. While adoption occurs sometimes in the middle of the
sample period, the means are computed across all years in the sample. Columns 7 and 8 show the
means only for adopting states before and after the adoption.
Columns 2 and 3 indicate that states that adopt biotech incentives appear to have a
stronger presence of life science industry, though much of that appears to be simply a matter of
size differences: the adopters are larger states on average. Yet, even after scaling by population,
the adopters tend to have a higher average level of biotech economic activity (columns 5 and 6).
The most striking difference is in the number of star biotech scientists—those scientists who are
major producers of biotech research. The table indicates that adopting states have significantly
more stars than nonadopting states. There are 7.9 star scientists per million residents in adopting
states, while the corresponding figure for nonadopting states is 3.5.
We also look at “new stars”—star scientists that are new to the state, either because they
were patenting in a different state in the previous year or because they were not stars in the
previous year. This group of movers and rising stars is particularly interesting, because it
captures one of the stated goals of state biotech subsidies, namely to attract and grow major
producers of biotech research. Just under 1 per million residents in adopting states are new stars,
while new stars in nonadopting states are only 0.4 per million.
Of course, some of the differences between adopting states and nonadopting states reflect
preexisting differences among states in the penetration of the life science sector, while other
differences reflect the effect of subsidies (if there is any). Absolute employment in
Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing (3254), Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing
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(325412), and Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences
(54171) is also higher in adopting states, although the per capita differences are smaller. For
example, 0.08 percent of residents in states that adopt incentives at some point during the sample
period work in the Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing industry, compared with 0.07
percent in states that do not adopt. 10 For Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing, there is no
discernible difference in per capita employment.
Salaries and number of establishments also tend to be higher among adopters: the average
salary in the Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing industry in states that adopt incentives
is $52,710, compared with $47,329 in states that do not adopt (2011 dollars); the number of
establishments is almost double in the former group relative to the latter.
Columns 7 and 8 of the table show the pre- and postadoption means for adopting states.
While there is more annual employment in pharmaceutical manufacturing after adoption, there
are actually lower levels of star scientists, new star scientists, R&D employment, and patents
after adoption. What this comparison of raw means is missing, and what our regression analysis
will capture, is the national trends in these variables. As the regression results show, it turns out
that the postadoption decline in these variables is actually smaller for adopting states compared
with the pattern over time in nonadopting states.
In our empirical analysis we use the subset of states for which we have nonmissing
observations in at least 20 years. Columns 1–3 of Panel B show the number of observations,
number of states, and number of years in our total sample. Columns 4–6 show the same for the
estimation sample. The number of states in each dependent variable’s balanced panel is also
shown at the bottom of each column in the regression results tables. 11
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Lastly, to give a sense of how much of the within-state variation in the R&D user cost is
driven by variation in the R&D tax credit, we first regress the R&D user cost on state and year
fixed effects and then regress the residual on the state R&D tax credit rate. The R-squared from
the latter regression is 0.345. By comparison, the R-squared from regressing the residual on the
state tax rate is just 0.004. Because the R&D user cost is a nonlinear function of these two state
tax policies along with federal tax policies, interactions of the state R&D tax credit and these
other components likely explain much of the remaining variation. We conclude that the key
(single) driver of within-state changes in the R&D user cost is the R&D credit rate.

POSSIBLE MECHANISMS AND ECONOMETRIC MODELS
The adoption of subsidies for the biotech industry can affect the state economy through a
number of different channels, both direct and indirect. Here we first discuss the most important
channels, and then describe how we propose to empirically assess their importance.
Mechanisms
Direct Effects
By making biotech R&D more profitable in the state, the adoption of incentives may
directly affect the state economy by increasing the size of the industry in the state. In practice,
this direct effect may result in changes in the industry’s employment, wages and number of
firms.
Employment. To quantify the employment effect, we will begin by focusing on the
effect of biotech incentives on the number of star scientists in the state. The presence of star
scientists is important because they are arguably the most important input in the biotech
production function.
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The literature on star scientists has highlighted the role that stars have historically played
in the birth and growth of the biotech industry since the mid 1970s. Star scientists have been
shown to play the key role in the development of the biotech scientific discoveries and their
successful commercialization. Their localization is therefore an important determinant of the
localization of the biotech industry itself. Zucker and Darby (1998) argue that the importance of
these individuals, especially the more entrepreneurial among them, “derives from the tacit
character of new breakthrough discoveries. In this way, knowledge, at least when it is new, is
embodied in particular individuals; it cannot diffuse rapidly, as might easily-duplicated recipes”
(p. 7).
The adoption of incentives can in principle increase the number of star scientists in a state
through two channels: 1) star scientists can relocate to the adopting state, or 2) states can
increase their patenting prolificacy of incumbent scientists already present and their movement
into the top tier of patenters.
Empirically, we will seek to separate these two margins.
The effect of subsidies on biotech research is expected to be vastly different for private
firms and academic institutions. Biotech incentives and R&D tax credits typically target private
sector research, not academic institutions, which are almost universally nontaxable
organizations. Thus incentives should have a smaller, possibly zero, direct effect on academic
researchers than on private sector researchers. While it is still possible that incentives might have
an indirect feedback effect on academia through displacement (expected negative effect) or
human capital spillovers and agglomeration economies (expected positive effect), this indirect
effect should be smaller than the direct effect. Our empirical analysis will differentiate between
biotech scientists in the private sector and in academia.
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While scientists are probably the most important input in the biotech industry, they are
not the only one. Quantitatively, the most important channel through which the adoption of
incentives might affect the local economy is through increases in the overall employment in the
industry. We will quantify this channel by assessing changes in overall industry employment
caused by biotech incentives. Biotech incentives may help established firms to expand, or foster
the creation of new biotech start-ups. While we do not have direct measures of start-up creation,
we will investigate the effect of incentives on the total number of biotech firms in the state.
We note that our estimates capture the overall effect of incentives on industry
employment. This overall effect is the sum of the direct effect on the size of the industry and any
localized agglomeration economies, if they exist.
Wages. Of course, the adjustment to an increase in the demand for biotech workers
induced by an increase in subsidies need not come entirely in the form of employment gains. If
the supply of scientists or other workers in the biotech sector is not elastic, the effect of
incentives on employment could be limited, but there could be an effect on salaries. Indeed,
Goolsbee (1998) finds that when the federal government increases subsidies for R&D, the
immediate effect on employment is rather limited because the short-run labor supply of this type
of worker is quite inelastic at the national level and most of the increased spending translates into
higher wages. Empirically, this appears particularly true for scientists related to defense R&D
such as physicists and aeronautical engineers.
Our setting is different in two respects. First, and most fundamentally, Goolsbee (1998)
was looking at nationwide changes while we look at state-level policies. The elasticity of labor
supply at the state level is likely to be quite different from the elasticity of labor supply at the
national level. While it is difficult to add highly specialized workers in the nation as a whole in
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the short run, workers are mobile, and highly educated workers are particularly mobile, making
state-level elasticity of labor supply likely to be significantly larger than the national level
elasticity. For this reason, we expect that while wage effects may take place, at least some of the
effect will manifest itself in increased employment.
Second, within each local labor market, there may be mobility across sectors. This type
of mobility is rare for biotech engineers, but it is probably common for less specialized
occupations, like support staff, commercial personnel, and unskilled labor, which arguably
represent a significant fraction of workers in the three industries we focus on. The degree of
mobility that exists between the biotech industry and the rest of the labor market does not have to
be identical to the one that exists between the government-supported research sector and the rest
of the labor market.
Indirect Effects
In addition to the direct effect on the biotech sector, the adoption of incentives may affect
parts of the state economy outside the biotech sector. First, biotech incentives need to be
financed implicitly or explicitly through higher taxes on the rest of the state taxpayers. This will
likely result in economically costly distortions and lower employment in other parts of the state
economy. Separate from the negative effect of taxation, there might be two additional indirect
effects on the local traded and non-traded sector:
1) Employment in the nontraded sector. It is possible that the employment gains in
biotech indirectly may result in employment changes in the nontraded sector outside biotech
through a local job multiplier effect. Every time a state economy generates a new biotech job by
attracting a new biotech company, additional jobs might also be created, mainly through
increased demand for local goods and services.
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This multiplier effect is expected to be particularly large for innovative industries like
biotech. First, workers in innovative industries tend to have higher than average salaries and
therefore tend to support more local jobs through their personal consumption of local nontraded
services. Second, firms in innovative industries tend to consume more local services. Third,
agglomeration economies may also be stronger in these industries, further increasing the local
multiplier effect. Consistent with this hypothesis, Moretti (2011) finds that for each additional
job in the manufacturing sector in a given city, 1.6 jobs are created in the local nontraded sector
in the long run and that this number is significantly larger for high-tech manufacturing industries
and industries that are more human capital intensive.
2) Employment in the traded sector outside biotech. In principle, it is possible that an
increase in biotech activity may affect labor demand not only in the local nontraded sector, but
also the local traded sector. 12 The sign of this relationship is a priori unknown. The increase in
labor demand in the state caused by an increase in biotech activity could result in higher local
wages (if local labor supply is not perfectly elastic) and therefore hurt employment in other parts
of the traded sector. Unlike the case of nontradable goods, the price of tradable goods is set on
national market and cannot adjust to local economic conditions. Thus, some of the production in
traded industries may be shifted to different cities. On the other hand, gains in biotech may
increase the local demand for intermediate goods and services. This effect depends on the
geography of the industry supply chain. While many industries are geographically clustered, the
magnitude of this effect is likely to be quantitatively limited if the market for traded industries is
truly national. 13
In practice, however, we expect the indirect effect of biotech on the rest of the tradable
sector to be limited. The biotech sector is very small with respect to the rest of all state
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economies. Thus, it is unlikely to generate strong general equilibrium effects on local wages.
Indeed, given that the salary effects on the biotech sector itself are small, as we will see in the
next section, it is unlikely that the salary effects outside biotech can be very large. 14 In addition,
the biotech supply chain is quite distinct from that of most other parts of the traded sector.
Econometric Models
We now turn to the description of our econometric models. For each of the outcome
variables that we consider, we estimate a two-way fixed effects regression of the outcome on
both the biotech incentive indicator variable and the R&D user cost variable, controlling for state
and year fixed effects.
(1)

yit = fi + ft + β Bit + γ rit + ε it

where yit is the outcome of interest; fi and ft are state and year fixed effects, respectively; Bit is the
biotech incentive indicator, and rit is the R&D user cost. 15 If incentives are successful at
increasing biotech activity in a state, we expect β > 0 and γ < 0, since a more generous R&D tax
credit would result in a lower user cost of R&D investment. We do not control for total
employment in the state, because employment in the local nontraded sector is likely to be
endogenous, and vary as a function of employment in biotech (see the section titled
“Employment in the Local Nontraded Sector”).
Identification of the effect of biotech incentives and the R&D user cost comes from
variation over time within a state. We assume that while states may differ in the political
influence of the local biotech industry, the exact timing of these changes is mostly driven by
exogenous factors. For example, California adopted specific incentives for biotech companies
when statewide Proposition 71 in support of state funding for stem cell research was approved by
voters. While California has had a significant biotech presence since the inception of the industry
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in the mid-1970s, the timing of the stem cell proposition was largely a reflection of idiosyncratic
political factors, especially the imposition of constraints on the use of federal funds for stem cell
research by the G. W. Bush administration.
As far as the R&D user cost is considered, we expect its variation to be largely
exogenous as well. First, because these credits apply to all R&D-performing industries,
idiosyncratic movements in the relative size and relative political influence of the biotech sector
should have a limited, if any, effect on R&D credit adoption. Second, as with biotech incentives,
the exact timing of R&D credit adoption likely owes more to idiosyncratic political and budget
conditions than to recent R&D activity.
However, we cannot rule out that the adoption of incentives reflects unobserved
differences across states in the prospects of the local biotech industry. While permanent
differences across states are fully accounted for, time-varying differences are not. The sign of the
potential bias is not known a priori. If the probability of adoption is correlated with unobserved
factors that favor the biotech industry—as in the case where states with strengthening innovation
clusters tend to adopt incentives for biotech and R&D—then our model will overestimate the
true effect of the subsidies. On the other hand, if the probability of adoption is correlated with
factors that impede growth of the biotech industry—as in the case where states that historically
lack innovation clusters tend to adopt incentives for biotech or R&D—then our models
underestimate the true effect of the subsidies.
To get a sense of the magnitude of this problem, we investigate what happens to
industries other than biotech. First, we perform a series of placebo tests, where we test for
whether the incentives are correlated with employment changes in high-tech industries other than
biotech.
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If states that have a growing local innovation sector are more likely to adopt incentives,
we might find that biotech incentives are positively correlated with employment in the computer
or chemical industry. We also test for whether the incentives are correlated with changes in
employment in non–high tech industries, like food manufacturing.
In addition, to formalize this intuition, for employment outcomes we estimate triple
difference models that estimate the differential effect of incentives on the biotech industry above
and beyond any effect on nonbiotech industries. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
(2)

y jit =+
f ji f jt + β BIO ( Bit ⋅ BIO jit ) + γ BIO ( rit ⋅ BIO jit ) + β 0 ( Bit ) + γ 0 ( rit ) + ε jit

,

where the subscript j indicates whether an observation is for the biotech sector or the nonbiotech
sector; fji and fjt are state*sector and year*sector fixed effects, respectively; BIOjit is an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 if the observation is for the biotech sector and 0 if the
observation is for the nonbiotech sector. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from
extending the triple difference models to the analysis of star scientists and patents. 16
Equations (1) and (2) measure short-run effects. To allow for the biotech incentives or the
R&D user cost to have delayed effects, we estimate a variant of Equation (1) with current plus
two lags of each variable:
2

(3)

2

yit = fi + ft + ∑ β s Bit − s + ∑ γ s rit − s + ε it
s 0=
s 0
=

In this case we report the cumulative effects over the three years (i.e., the sum of the coefficients
on the current and two lags of the biotech incentive or R&D user cost). 17 This extension is more
useful for identifying the treatment effect of changes in the R&D user cost than it is for
identifying that of biotech incentives. This is because the R&D user cost varies from year to
year, whereas the biotech incentive dummy variable is a step function because a change in this
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variable from 0 to 1 tends to be permanent. Including lags in the R&D user cost allows for the
possibility that the effect of a temporary change in the R&D user cost may not occur for one or
two years after the change. Delayed effects from the enactment of a biotech incentive will be
picked up even without including lags because the value of the incentive dummy will remain 1
for years beyond the enactment. Nonetheless, it is useful to include lags of this dummy when
including lags of the R&D user cost to control for any contemporaneous correlation between
adoption of the two types of subsidies. Moreover, including lags of this dummy tests for whether
the effect gets larger over time by seeing whether the postadoption outcome is even larger in
periods more than one (or two) years beyond the adoption year (compared with the postadoption
outcome including the adoption year).
Residuals in our models are likely to be serially correlated. Two factors make serial
correlation an especially important concern in our setting. First, the unexplained component of
our outcome variables is likely to be positively serially correlated. This happens because
unobserved state-specific shocks to a number of biotech stars and employment in biotech are
likely to be fairly persistent over time, although not completely permanent. After all, the actual
number of biotech stars or employment in biotech in a state does not vary much from year to
year, but it is not fixed either. Second, the key independent variables are also highly serially
correlated within each state over time. The indicator for biotech subsidies takes the value of 0 in
all the years before adoption and the value of 1 in all the years after adoption. The measure of
R&D user cost is also highly serially correlated. These two factors reinforce each other to create
potentially large mismeasurement in the OLS standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan
2004). Throughout the paper, all models estimate Newey-West standard errors allowing for
AR(2) serial correlation. 18
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To estimate the effect of a state’s incentives on other states’ outcomes we estimate
models with spatial lags:
(4)

yit = fi + ft + β Bit + γ rit + β out Bitout + γ out ritout + ε it ,

out
where X it is a spatial lag of a given variable X = {B, r}, defined as

=
X itout

J

J

j ≠i

j ≠i

ωi , j X j ,t ;
∑=
∑ ωi, j 1

.

A spatial lag is simply a weighted average of Xit from other states. The weights, ωit, are
the elements of a spatial weighting matrix meant to capture the relevant “relatedness” between
pairs of states. We present results below based on two complementary definition of distance: 1)
geographical proximity (inverse distance) between states’ population centroids (provided by the
Census Bureau); and 2) economic distance as measured by population flows (from Census
Bureau data on interstate migration).
Finally, we estimate models that test whether the effect of adoption of incentives depends
on the order of adoption. To do this, we generate a dummy variable, B4it, that is one for the first
four adopters of biotech incentives and zero otherwise. (We set out to use the first three adopters,
but Colorado and Missouri—both 1999 adopters—tied for third place). Similarly, we generate a
dummy, R4it, that is one for the first four R&D credit adopters and zero otherwise. We then
expand Equation (1) above to include these dummies and their interactions with their
corresponding incentive variable:
(5)

yit= fi + ft + β Bit + γ rit + ∂B4it + λ R4it + σ B4it ∗ Bit + η R4it ∗ rit + ε it
In the presence of strong agglomeration economies and large fixed costs, states that adopt

earlier should enjoy a stronger effect (σ > 0 and/or η < 0) than states that adopt later. On the
other hand, in the absence of significant agglomeration economies and large fixed costs, the
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initially positive effect of the subsidy may decline when other states also adopt and the relative
attractiveness of the state declines.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Number of Star Scientists
We begin by estimating the effect of incentives on the most skilled part of biotech labor
force, the star scientists. 19 Panel A in Table 2 reports estimates of Equation (1) via OLS where
the dependent variable is either the number of stars (columns 1—3) or new stars (column 4—6).
The two preadoption means provided at the bottom of the panel are the baseline number of star
scientists in adopting states in the year before adoption of the biotech incentive and in the year
before adoption of the R&D subsidies, respectively. For biotech incentives, the percent effect is
defined as the ratio of the coefficient over the preadoption mean, holding constant R&D tax
credits. For R&D user cost, the percent effect is the effect of an increase in R&D tax credits large
enough to lower the R&D user cost by 10 percent evaluated at the precredit adoption sample
mean, holding constant biotech incentives. 20
Entries in column 1 indicate that the adoption of biotech incentives is associated with an
average increase in the number of star scientists equal to 14.7. Compared with the baseline
number of 100.7 star scientists on average in adopting states in the year before adoption, this
effect represents a 14.6 percent increase. As expected, the coefficient on the R&D user cost is
negative: a higher user cost implies less R&D investment and therefore fewer star scientists. The
point estimate indicates that an increase in R&D tax credits large enough to lower the R&D user
cost by 0.1 (about 8 percent of its precredit adoption sample mean) would raise the number of
star scientists in the state by 7.8 scientists. Evaluated at the precredit adoption sample means for
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both the dependent variable and the R&D user cost, the implied percentage increase in star
scientists from a 10 percent reduction in the R&D user cost is 22.3 percent. We regard both of
these effects as economically important. 21
The variable “new stars” captures positive changes over time in the number of star
scientists in a state. While “stars” is a stock, “new stars” is a flow. When the number of new stars
is the dependent variable, the coefficients on the incentives in the two-way fixed effects models
such as Equation (1) represent the effects of the incentives on the rate of change in star scientists.
Estimates in columns 3 and 4 indicate that biotech incentives and reductions in the R&D user
cost are associated with an acceleration in the growth of star scientists. Quantitatively, the effect
appears strong. Entries in column 3, for example, indicate that the adoption of biotech incentives
is associated with an average increase in the number of new stars of 1.9, a 7.2 percent increase
relative to the preadoption mean, though the point estimate is not statistically significant. An
increase in R&D tax credits that lowers the R&D user cost by 10 percent would raise the number
of new star scientists in the state by 17.3 percent relative to the baseline.
In columns 2 and 4 we report the medium-run effect, as measured by the cumulative
effect for the first three years. This medium-run effect is statistically indistinguishable from the
immediate effect. 22 The percent effects of biotech incentives for stars and new stars are,
respectively, 11.3 percent and 5.5 percent. The percent effects of a 10 percent lower R&D user
cost for stars and new stars are, respectively, 24.1 percent and 15.3 percent.
We are also interested in uncovering possible interaction effects of biotech subsidies and
R&D tax credits. Columns 3 and 6 show the results of including an interaction between the
biotech incentive dummy and the R&D user cost. Here, we aim to assess whether biotech and
R&D incentives have extra benefits if a state employs both of them, over and above their direct
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effect. We find that the interaction term is statistically different from zero, indicating that the
adoption of both biotech incentives and more generous R&D tax credits results in an additional
positive effect on stars above and beyond their individual effects. (Recall that a negative
coefficient on the interaction implies higher employment from having both a biotech incentive
and a lower R&D user cost since the expected sign on the R&D user cost is negative.) 23
Difference-in-difference estimates in Table 2 are biased if states adopting incentives
experience different trends in the number of biotech stars. In Appendix Table 2 we investigate
the robustness of our estimates to the inclusion of four region-specific time trends (columns 1
and 2) and 9 division-specific time trends (columns 3 and 4). The models here are similar to the
baseline models in panel A of Table 2. Estimates that condition on region or division trends are
qualitatively consistent with the corresponding estimates in Table 2. 24
Intensive vs. Extensive Margin
Overall, Panel A indicates that when a state adopts more generous incentives, it results in
a significant increase in the number of biotech star scientists. The number of star scientists in a
state can change because star scientists relocate to the adopting state or because incumbent
scientists already present in the state increase their patenting prolificacy and move into the top
tier of patenters. Separating these two sources of variation is useful because it provides some
information on the possible mechanism(s) underlying the incentives’ effects.
In panel B of Table 2 we address this question by separately analyzing these extensive
and intensive margins. We define the extensive margin of “new stars” in a given state in year t as
the flow of star patenters who were in a different state in the year t − 1, based on year t − 1
patent(s). (Patenters with patents in multiple states in a given year are assigned to the state where
they have the most patents.) We define the intensive margin of “new stars” in a given state in
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year t as the flow of star patenters who were in the same state in year t − 1 based on year t − 1
patent(s) and did not qualify as “stars” because their 10-year trailing biotech patent count
(measured in t − 1) was not in the top 5 percent of all biotech patenters. By construction, the sum
of the intensive and extensive margins equals the variable “new star” used in Panel A.
Estimates indicate that biotech incentives are quite effective on the extensive margin but
have no discernible effect on the intensive margin, at least within three years from adoption. In
fact, the estimated effect of biotech incentives on the extensive margin more than accounts for
the total effect on new stars, with the effect on the intensive margin being negative but
statistically insignificant. (The coefficient on total new stars is of course equal to the sum of the
coefficients on each of the two margins.)
We find that R&D incentives appear to stimulate both margins. The point estimate on the
extensive margin is much larger, but percentage effect relative to the baseline is only slightly
larger for the extensive margin. The percent effects of a 10 percent reduction in the R&D user
cost on the extensive and intensive margin are, respectively, 18.0 percent and 15.3 percent.
Overall, it seems that it is easier to incentivize existing star scientists to move to a state than it is
to turn less prolific inventors already in your state into stars. We caution, however, that patenting
takes time. It is possible that three years is a time horizon not long enough to allow for a
complete estimation of the intensive margin effect.
Private Sector Stars vs. Academic Stars
Biotech incentives and R&D tax credits typically target private sector research, not
academic institutions, which are almost universally nontaxable organizations. As argued above,
the incentives should have a smaller, possibly zero, direct effect on academic researchers than on
private sector researchers.
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In Table 3, we separately identify the effect of subsidies on stars, depending on whether
they are individual patenters, patenters working for academic institutions, or patenters working
for corporations and other nonacademic institutions. For both biotech incentives and R&D tax
credits, we uncover a larger percent effect on individual star patenters and corporate and other
nonacademic star patenters than on academic stars. In particular, the percentage effects of
biotech incentives are 16.5 percent for individual stars, 7.2 percent for corporate and other
nonacademic stars, and 0.1 percent for academic stars. For the R&D user cost, we find an effect
for all three categories. The point estimates are larger for individual stars and corporate and
nonacademic stars than they are for university patenters, yet the estimate percentage effects are
largest for university patenters. However, it must be noted that the percentage effects for
university patenters are particularly difficult to measure given that the baseline (pre-creditadoption) level of university new stars is very close to zero.
Overall, the results indicate that the incentives have a larger effect on individuals and
corporations than they are on universities. This is consistent with the hypothesis that academic
institutions may not benefit from tax incentives as much as private sector researchers.
Overall Industry Employment
The findings on star scientists are important not just in itself, but especially because of
the role that stars play in the birth and growth of the biotech industry. But of course, the vast
majority of workers in the biotech industry are not star scientists. Table 4 assesses the effect of
subsidies on total industry employment (measured in thousands of jobs) for the three industries
that are closest to biotech: 1) the Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing sector (columns 1,
2, and 3); 2) the Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing sector (columns 4, 5, and 6), which
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is a subset of Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing; and 3) the Scientific R&D sector
(columns 7, 8, and 9). 25
Estimates indicate that adoption of biotech incentives is associated with a significant
increase in the number of jobs in all three industries. The estimated employment effects are
economically sizable. For example, the entry in column 1 suggests that the adoption of biotech
incentives by a state is associated with 1,324 additional Pharmaceutical and Medicine
Manufacturing jobs in the state. Compared with the average baseline industry employment level
in adopting states in the year before adoption (8,043), this amounts to a 16.5 percent increase in
employment. The medium-run effect in column 2 is slightly smaller, but not statistically
different. The percentage effect is similar for employment in the R&D industry (columns 7 and
8). Not surprisingly, the percentage effects are largest for the Pharmaceutical Preparation
Manufacturing sector—a subset of Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing and arguably a
closer approximation of biotech employment—at about 30 percent (columns 4 and 5).
More generous R&D tax credits are also associated with more employment in the three
industries. An increase in R&D tax credits large enough to lower the R&D user cost by 10
percent would raise industry employment by between 6 percent and 18 percent. As with biotech
incentives, the percentage effects of a 10 percent reduction in the R&D user cost are largest for
the Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing sector at 15.6 percent. Surprisingly, the
percentage employment effect of a 10 percent reduction in the R&D user cost is small and
insignificant in the R&D industry. However, the effect becomes significant if one allows for a
delayed effect by including two lags of the R&D user cost. In this case, the cumulative effect of a
10 percent reduction in the user cost is 10.3 percent.
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Columns 3, 6, and 9 investigate the possible interactions of biotech subsidies and R&D
tax credits. Point estimates and percent effects suggest that having both a biotech incentive and a
low R&D user cost leads to higher employment in these sectors. This is consistent with the
presence of an interaction effect uncovered above for star scientists.
The estimated effects of the subsidies for total employment in Table 4 are generally
similar to the estimated effects for stars in Table 2 in percent terms. This implies that the
provision of incentives does not alter the ratio of stars in the workforce. In retrospect, this is not
too surprising. The share of stars is largely determined by the production function, and there is
no reason to expect that the provision of subsidies alters the technology used by biotech
companies. The exception seems to be the Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing sector,
where the percent effect is significantly larger for overall employment than star scientists.
Our estimates of the effect of R&D tax credits are consistent with some of the key
estimates in the literature. Consider for example an increase in R&D tax credits resulting in a 10
percent reduction in R&D user costs. Assuming that R&D costs are one-quarter of overall costs
in biotech firms, a 10 percent reduction in R&D user costs cause a 2.5 percent reduction in
overall costs. Our estimates indicate that such a reduction would result in an increase in
employment of 2 percent to 4 percent. This range is consistent with estimates by Bartik and
Erickcek (2010). In their analysis of Michigan’s MEGA program, they find an elasticity of −0.2
of state business activity with respect to overall state and local business taxes, corresponding
roughly to an elasticity of −4 with respect to a change in overall business costs, as state and local
business taxes tend to be somewhere around 5 percent of overall business value-added.
Bartik and Hollenbeck (2012) also address a similar question to our analysis here.. They
study the effects of an R&D tax credit in the state of Washington on job creation. They find that
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this tax credit created jobs: employment grew by between 0.5 and 0.6 percent at the firms that
claimed credits because of the tax credit. Once scaled by the size of the R&D credit, this estimate
is not inconsistent with our estimates, although somewhat smaller.
Placebos and Triple-Difference Estimates
Identification of coefficients in Table 4 comes from within-state changes over time in
incentives. State fixed effects fully account for any permanent difference between states that
adopt incentives and those that do not. But estimates in these difference-in-difference models
may be biased if the timing of incentive adoption is correlated with unobserved shocks to a state
local economy. For example, it is possible in principle that states tend to adopt biotech incentives
when the local biotech sector is stronger than in the rest of the nation. This would be the case if
economic strength of the local biotech industry translates into lobbying clout. If adoption is
positively correlated with industry strength, our estimate of the adoption effect would be upward
biased. The reverse could also be true if states tend to adopt biotech incentives in a
countercyclical/stimulate way, i.e., when the local biotech sector is weak. In this case our
estimate of the adoption effect would be downward biased.
An examination of the media reporting around the time of adoption in four states did not
reveal any particular pattern in the motivations used by legislators for adoption. To obtain some
more systematic evidence on the validity of our identification assumption, we provide three
additional pieces of information. First, as mentioned above, we include results where we
condition on four region-specific trends and nine division-specific trends. Our point estimates
appear robust to the inclusion of these controls (see Appendix Table 2).
Second, we test for whether the incentives are correlated with changes in employment in
tradable industries other than biotech. We look only at tradable industries because increased
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activity in the biotech industry resulting from subsidies may well cause increased demand for
local nontradable services such as construction, retail, and real estate. 26 Thus, for the purpose of a
placebo test, we focus on other tradable industries which should not materially be affected by
biotech-specific incentives, though they could be affected by more general incentives, such as
R&D credits. We consider overall Manufacturing excluding Chemicals; Machinery
Manufacturing; Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing; and Food Manufacturing.
Other nonchemical manufacturing industries did not have sufficient state-level data coverage.
The results are shown in Table 5. The coefficient on the biotech incentive is either
insignificantly different from zero or negative in all cases, suggesting no stimulative effect from
the incentive. Perhaps surprisingly, the R&D user cost is also found to have no effect on
employment in these industries. Possible reasons for this are that R&D scientists are a smaller
share of total employment in these industries compared with the biotech industry and/or that
labor supply of R&D workers in these industries is more inelastic.
We explore more systematically the idea of using other tradable industries as a control
group by providing triple-difference estimates. Specifically, we report estimates of Equation (2),
using our baseline specification where outcomes now vary by state, year, and sector (where
sector is “biotech” or “nonbiotech”) and interacting all right-hand-side variables, including year
and state fixed effects, by a biotech sector indicator. The triple-difference estimates of the
incentive is identified from the difference between the biotech sector and the nonbiotech sector
in the preadoption to postadoption change in the outcome for adopting states relative to the
change over the same period for nonadopting states. Unlike Table 5, here we include all
nonbiotech industries in the tradable sector in the analysis, in order to use all available
information on control industries. 27 We do not include nontradable industries because
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employment changes there are endogenous to biotech subsidies due to employment multiplier
effects (see the following section).
The results are shown in Table 6. The focus in the triple-difference models is on the
coefficients on biotech incentives. The coefficients on R&D user cost are reported for
completeness but are not particularly informative on the validity of our identifying assumption:
unlike biotech-specific incentives, R&D tax credits affect both the treatment and the control
group. The triple-difference coefficient in the table measures whether R&D tax credits
differentially affect biotech relative to other traded industries.
We find estimates for the effects of biotech-specific incentives that are similar to those
from difference-in-difference models. Notably, the percent effects of the biotech-specific
incentives are very close to those in Table 4. We find that reductions in the R&D user cost
increase employment in pharmaceutical manufacturing more so than in other tradable industries
(as a whole), but surprisingly we find the opposite for employment in the R&D industry.
Overall, the evidence in Tables 5 and 6 is reassuring. While we cannot rule out the
possibility that that the adoption of incentives reflects unobserved time-varying differences
across states in the prospects of the local biotech industry, this evidence lends some credibility to
our identification assumptions.
Employment in the Local Nontraded Sector
We have found that biotech-specific incentives and tax credits for R&D result in
increases in biotech employment. A related question is whether this direct effect on employment
is limited to the biotech sector or it extends to other parts of the labor force through the type of
multiplier effects discussed earlier in the section titled “Mechanisms.”
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Consistent with the notion of a strong local multiplier effect, Table 7 indicates that the
adoption of biotech incentives results in significant employment gains in the construction
industry (37,000 additional jobs, 16 percent of preadoption baseline), retail industry (31,000
additional jobs, 6.7 percent of the baseline) and real estate industry (6,000 additional jobs, 8.0
percent of the baseline). States adopting tax credits for R&D experience significant employment
gains in construction but not in retail or real estate. The percent effect for construction is 7.6
percent.
These indirect effects are quantitatively very large, especially the ones for biotech
incentives. Taken at face value, these effects imply significantly larger multiplier effects than the
one found by Moretti (2011) for high-tech, human capital–intensive industries. We note that the
magnitude of these effects could in principle reflect the possibility that other policies are enacted
simultaneously with the changes in biotech incentives or with changes in the generosity of R&D
tax credits that might affect the nontraded sector.

It could also reflect the presence of

unobserved shocks to the local economy that are positively correlated with adoption. 28
Salaries in the Biotech Industry
Our main focus is on employment, measured by both the number of jobs and the number
of star scientists. In additional models, we also look at salaries. Table 8 focuses on salaries.
Following the standard in the literature estimating wage equations, we measure the dependent
variable in log values. The coefficients on the biotech incentives thus represent elasticities;
percentage effects are simply the elasticities times 100. The coefficients on the R&D user cost
represent the percent effect of a one-unit change in the R&D user cost. We compute the percent
effects of a 10 percent reduction in the R&D user cost, shown in the table, by multiplying the
coefficient by 10 percent of the mean R&D user cost in the year prior to credit adoption for
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adopting states. Consistent with a model where labor supply of biotech workers at the state level
is fairly elastic, we find the effect of subsidies on salaries to be limited. Biotech incentives are
not associated with wage increases in the Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing (columns
1 and 2) and in the Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing sectors. There is a positive
although small effect of adoption for the Scientific R&D sector: adoption is associated with 0.5
percent increase in the sector’s salaries (column 5), but over a three-year period the effect
disappears. Turning to R&D user costs, we find that changes in the user cost get capitalized to
some extent into salaries in the pharmaceutical industries but not in the R&D industry. However,
the effect is quite small: a 10 percent reduction in the R&D user cost results in a 0.4 percent
increase in the average salary in Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing as well as in the
subsector of Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing.
The small wage effects in Table 8 stand in contrast with Goolsbee’s (1998) findings of
large wage effects following labor demand increases due to policy changes. The difference is
likely to be explained by the differences in the geographical scope of the analysis, as discussed in
the section titled “Mechanisms.” In our analysis policy variation occurs at the state level—thus
allowing for inter-state mobility to induce significant shifts in local labor supply—while in
Goolsbee’s analysis the policy variation is national.
In addition, workers in the three industries under consideration are unlikely to be all
specialized. A significant fraction of workers employed in biotech have skills that are not
specific only to that industry. Thus, there is likely to be significant within-state, cross-sector
reallocation, at least for workers in nonscientific occupations. For example, when demand for
administrative staff increases in biotech in response to an increase in state subsidies, some
administrative staff might leave other sectors to move to biotech. Unfortunately, we do not have
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salary data for scientists. In theory we would expect their salaries to be more sensitive to demand
shifts than the salary of the general population, as movements across industries are less likely.
Biotech Establishments and Biotech Patents
One important question is whether state subsidies for innovation help the formation of
start-ups. We do not have direct measures of start-up creation, but we report the effect on number
of establishments. Increases in the number of establishments may arise either because state
incentives foster more start-up creation, or because established companies open new facilities in
a state.
In Table 9 we report the effect on number of establishments. Increases in the number of
establishments may arise either because state incentives foster more start-up creation, or because
established companies open new facilities in a state.
We find a significant effect of biotech incentives on the number of establishments in both
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing and the R&D industry. The percent effects are between 10
percent and 18 percent. By contrast, we find no significant effect of declines in the user cost of
R&D on number of establishments in Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, but we find a significant
increase in Scientific R&D establishments. We find that a 10 percent reduction in the user cost of
R&D is associated with about a 14 percent increase in R&D establishments, and the effect
appears to grow slightly over time.
The analysis so far has focused on the inputs used by biotech firms. We now examine one
measure of output: biotech patents. Given that we find an increase in employment and in star
scientists—arguably important inputs in the production of innovation—one might expect a
significant increase in number of patents filed—arguably a good proxy for output in the process
of innovation. The findings, shown in Table 10, are mixed. On the one hand, we fail to find a
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statistically significant effect of biotech incentives on biotech patents, though the point estimate
implies a fairly large percentage effect (about 14 percent). On the other hand, we find a
significant effect of R&D user costs, indicating that variation in R&D user costs has a more
immediate effect on patent filings. The percentage effect of a 10 percent reduction in the R&D
user cost is found to be 27.8 percent. In Appendix Table 2 we include four region-specific trends
and nine division-specific trends. Our point estimates appear robust to the inclusion of these
controls.
We also look at biotech patent counts broken out by those patented by individuals versus
universities versus corporations and other nonacademic institutions. The estimated percentage
effects are similar across the three categories. As with total patents, the biotech incentives have
no statistically significant effect while reductions in the R&D user cost increase patents for each
category by roughly 25 percent.
Models with Spatial Lags
We now turn to the question of whether the provision of local incentives is a zero-sum
game across jurisdictions, or whether it increases aggregate biotech activity. Previous work on
state tax incentives (not specific to biotech) has tended to find negative, or “beggar thy
neighbor,” effects of own-state incentives on other states and a zero-sum game nationally
(Chirinko and Wilson 2008; Goolsbee and Maydew 2000; Wilson 2009). We cannot directly
evaluate this question, but we provide some indirect evidence by testing whether the provision of
incentives results in a decline (or increase) in star scientists and employment in nearby states (see
Equation [4]). 29
We measure proximity using either a geographical definition or an economic one. In
panel A of Table 11 we measure distance using a spatial weighting matrix based on population
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flows between states. In particular, population flows between state i and state j is defined as the
average between the annual percent of population moving from state i to state j, and the annual
percent of population moving from state j to state i, based on Census Bureau data. For the
biotech incentive, which is expected to have a positive in-state effect on star scientists, a positive
coefficient on the spatial lag would imply a positive spillover of one state’s incentives to star
scientist employment in “nearby” states while a negative coefficient implies a negative or
“beggar thy neighbor” effect. For the R&D user cost—which, when higher, results in fewer star
scientists—a negative coefficient implies a positive spillover while a positive coefficient implies
a “beggar thy neighbor” effect.
The table indicates that for the total stock of stars, there is a significant negative effect of
one state’s incentives on neighboring states. The magnitude of the out-of-state effect is roughly
similar to that of the own state effect, suggesting a zero-sum game nationally. However, we
should note that the point estimates on the spatial lags are imprecisely estimated. Hence, we are
hesitant to make definitive statements about the net effect of the incentives nationally. In contrast
to this finding for the stock of star scientists, we find no evidence of spatial spillovers for entry
of new stars or total employment in biotech industries. For the R&D user cost, we find no
evidence of statistically significant spatial spillovers except for the flow of new star scientist for
which we find a positive spillover. 30 That is, a reduction in the R&D user cost in one state
appears to increase the flow of new star scientists to both that state and its neighbors. This
positive spillover could reflect regional agglomeration forming as a result of one state reducing
R&D costs.
The results are quite similar if we use a spatial weighting matrix based on geographical
proximity. Panel B shows estimates from models that use a distance-based weighting matrix
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based on the inverse of the distance between each pair of states. It includes only those states with
nonmissing data for the particular dependent variable in that particular regression. 31
The point estimates using a distance-based spatial lag are very similar to estimates in
panel B, although the standard errors are higher. The two statistically significant cells in panel A
are no longer significant. Overall, the findings of panel A and B point to some displacement but
are not precise enough to draw firm conclusions.
The Effect of Early Adoption
Finally, we test whether the effect of adopting biotech incentives is stronger for earlier
adopters, as one would expect in the presence of strong agglomeration forces. To do so, we add
an interaction between the biotech incentive dummy and an indicator for whether the state is one
of the first four adopters of biotech incentives (see Equation [5]). 32 Similarly, we include an
interaction between the R&D user cost and an indicator for whether the state is one of the first
four adopters of an R&D tax credit. We focus on the effects on stars, new stars, and employment
in each of the three biotech-related industries.
Our estimates in Appendix Table 4 point to a generally small effect of biotech incentives
for earlier adopters. For each of the five outcomes, it appears that the effect for earlier adopters is
virtually zero (as the interaction effects roughly cancel out the total effects), while the effect for
later adopters is stronger. For R&D tax credits, we find that early credit adopters experienced
larger pharmaceutical employment gains from the resulting drops in the R&D user cost than did
later adopters. However, for star scientists and R&D employment, we find no significant
difference in the R&D user cost effect between early and later adopters. 33
Overall, there is little evidence that early adopters enjoy larger benefits from adoption.
We caution, however, that we cannot draw strong conclusions from this test, as the magnitude of
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the biotech incentives is unknown and may have been set endogenously by states. In the presence
of agglomeration economies, for example, late adopters face stronger incentives to overcome the
early adopters’ advantage and may provide more generous subsidies.

CONCLUSIONS
States spend billions of dollars to attract R&D activity to their jurisdictions. We shed
light on how effective these policies are at attracting jobs in biotech. We find significant
increases in the number of star scientists, the number of biotech workers, and the number of
establishments, but limited effects on salaries and patents. While we think that the timing of the
variation in the incentive levels is largely driven by idiosyncratic political factors, we cannot rule
out the possibility that it may be endogenous.
Although we find that subsidies to biotech R&D raise biotech employment in a state, we
stress that this finding does not tell us whether those subsidies are economically justified.
Knowledge of the magnitude, the geographical scope, and the direction of localized spillovers is
a prerequisite for an appropriate design of an efficient innovation policy.

NOTES
1. Bartik’s (1991) seminal book on place-based economic policies provides a comprehensive taxonomy and
discussion of the different types of policies. In the United States, state and local governments spend $80 billion per
year on these policies (Story 2012), while the federal government spends $15 billion (GAO 2012). Examples of
location-based policies typically adopted by local and state governments include direct subsidies and/or tax
incentives for local firms, subsidized loans, industrial parks, technology transfer programs, export assistance and
export financing, the provision of infrastructure, and workforce training.
2. The hypothesis of agglomeration economies dates back at least to Marshall (1920), who discussed how they could
be generated by a variety of mechanisms, including localized knowledge spillovers, thick labor markets for
specialized workers, and localized supply chains.
3. Economists have long cautioned that due to the complex nature of the market failures at work it is unclear what
cluster policies should do in practice and how they should do it (Duranton 2011). A number of recent empirical
studies have sought to assess the effectiveness of statewide incentives. Examples include, but are not limited to,
Faulk (2002); Bartik and Erickcek (2010); Bartik and Eberts (2012); Chirinko and Wilson (2008); Chirinko and
Wilson (2010); Wilson (2009); Head et al. (1999); and Duranton, Gobillon, and Overman (2011). Overall, the
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empirical evidence on the effect of tax incentives on local labor markets is still limited and more work is needed to
understand how in practice these subsidies contribute to economic development.
4. We follow the literature in using the term star scientists, though it should be noted that patenters include
institutions such as universities and corporations in addition to individuals. Specifically, in our biotech patent
database, individuals account for 70.9 percent of patents, universities account for 5.6 percent, and other institutions
(mostly corporations) account for 23.5 percent of patents.
5. The Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing industry is an exception.
6. See Kline and Moretti (2013) for a discussion.
7. North Carolina is the earliest adopter. Because the state adopted a biotech incentive in 1984, and our data begin in
1990, North Carolina does not contribute to identification of the coefficients in our regression models.
8. The city and state of the patenter may be measured with error, especially when there is a difference between the
location of the inventor and the location of her employer. It is also possible that there are two or more inventors with
the same name within the same city, state, and year, although such instances should be quite rare because the
number of biotech patents within a city-state-year cell is rarely large and hence the probability of two inventors
within that cell having the exact same name should be very small. Both of these cases would induce classical
measurement error in the dependent variable, and so not a cause of bias.
9. In principle, restricting the third group to R&D in Life Science would be better, but too many states have their
values set to missing to protect confidentiality. There also is a NAICS industry for “Research and Development in
Biotechnology” (541711), however, employment, wage, and establishments data for this industry is only available
from 2007 onward.
10. The states that have the most jobs per capita in the industry are Indiana (2.71 percent), North Carolina (2.13
percent), and Connecticut (2.05 percent).
11. We do this because we need to have a sufficiently long time dimension in our panel to be able to identify (with
reasonable precision) state fixed effects as well as the medium-run (over three years) effects of the incentives. This
leads to there being a different number of states across outcomes (dependent variables) in the tables and makes the
results less comparable from outcome to outcome. As a robustness check we have repeated all of the regressions
with the same sample of 28 states that have non-missing data for all of the outcomes that we look at. The results are
quite similar, though the standard errors are larger. (Results available on request.) Limiting the sample in this way
involves a considerable loss of information for most of the outcomes, many of which have data for all 50 states.
12. This would make the placebo tests and the triple difference models discussed above invalid.
13. In addition, if agglomeration economies are important, the increase in biotech may result in more local
agglomeration outside biotech.

14. Moretti (2010) finds limited effect of shocks to one part of the traded sector on other parts of the traded sector.
15. We jointly estimate the separate effects of the biotech incentives and the R&D user cost rather than estimating
their effects in separate regressions to avoid any possible bias due to correlation between biotech incentives and
R&D credits. Estimating the effects in separate regressions yields similar results.
16. Individual-level patent data with the relevant geocoding information are available from the NBER Patent
Database only until 2006. Given that several of the biotech incentives in our data set were adopted shortly before
and after 2006, using these data to construct nonbiotech measures of star scientists and patents provides too few
years to estimate the effect of incentive adoption with any reasonable degree of precision.
17. We also experimented with additional lags, which resulted in similar cumulative effects though with larger
standard errors.
18. See Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan (2004) for alternative solutions to this problem.
19. As noted earlier, we use the term “scientists” loosely here, as about 30 percent of the patenters in our biotech
patent database are not individuals but rather universities, corporations, and other institutions. Below, we look at the
effect of incentives on stars defined separately for individual, universities, and corporations and other institutions.
20. Specifically, we calculate this elasticity as − ( ∂y ∂r ) ⋅ ( r / y ) 10 , where the upper bars denote the pre-creditadoption sample means and ( ∂y ∂r ) is the coefficient on the R&D user cost (r).
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21. We note that comparing the magnitude of the effect of biotech subsidies to the effect of R&D tax credits is not
feasible, due to the lack of data on the generosity of biotech subsidies: We do not know whether biotech subsidies
are cheap or expensive for states, compared to R&D tax credits.
22. Recall that because the R&D user cost varies from year to year whereas the biotech incentive dummy variable is
a step function, this model is more useful for R&D user cost than it is for biotech incentives.
23 In these models we do not report the percent effect because it is unclear how to define the pre-adoption means.
24. We have performed numerous additional robustness checks that are available on request. Our baseline models
are based only on states for which we have non-missing observation for at least 20 consecutive years. We do this
because we need to have a sufficiently long time dimension in our panel to be able to identify (with reasonable
precision) state fixed effects as well as the medium-run (over three years) effects of the incentives. However,
shortening the length of the panel gives qualitatively similar results, but larger standard errors. In addition, we have
reestimated all of models with the same sample of 28 states that have nonmissing data for all of the outcomes to
increase comparability. The results are quite similar, though as one would expect the standard errors are larger. We
have also reestimated our main models replacing the R&D user cost variable with the R&D credit rate. The results
are shown in Appendix Table 3. We find that the R&D credit rate generally has positive and significant effects on
economic outcomes in the biotech sector, consistent with the negative and significant effects of the R&D user cost
we found in our baseline specifications (given that the user cost is inversely related to the credit rate). We also
attempted to estimate models that include state specific trends, but standard errors were so large to make these
estimates uninformative.
25. Note that the definition of the last industry group is not ideal, because it is rather expansive: not only does it
include all life science R&D, but also other types of R&D outside the life science sector. A narrower definition is
not feasible. While R&D biotech is identified in the County Business Patterns in recent years, it is not identified
before 1998.
26. We investigate this possibility below.
27. Data limitations preclude triple-difference estimates of the models for biotech stars in Tables 2 and 3.
28. This would cast doubt on our identification strategy. However, we are not aware of any specific examples of
state-sponsored subsidies to the nontraded sector that tend to be systematically associated with biotech incentives.
29. Kline and Moretti (2013) provide a model-based approach to estimating the aggregate effects of place based
policies.
30. The lack of significant negative spillovers from R&D tax incentives on biotech stars and employment contrasts
with the negative spillovers of such incentives on R&D spending found in Wilson (2009). It is possible that
spillovers are more negative outside of the biotech sector where positive agglomeration-related spillovers could be
more prevalent. Another possible explanation is that R&D spending is much more geographically mobile than is
employment. Part of the spending mobility may reflect increases in salaries of R&D workers in tax-advantaged
states. Part of it could also reflect corporations relabeling R&D spending from one location to another in response to
differentials in R&D tax incentives.
31. One obvious alternative measure of distance would be an indicator for contiguity. A contiguity-based spatial
weighting matrix is appealing in theory, but it is unfeasible in our setting. For employment, salaries, and
establishments, there are states with missing data. This makes the contiguity weighting matrix unmeasurable for
many states.
32. We originally intended to use an indicator for whether the state is one of the first three adopters, but the place of
third adopter is a tie between Colorado and Missouri.
33. Findings are robust to the controlling for the state share of national biotech employment.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Panel A. Means
Mean (in levels)
Mean (per 100,000 residents)
Biotech
Biotech
Incentive
NonIncentive
NonVariable Name
All States
Adopters
adopters All States
Adopters
adopters
Star Scientists
28.04
80.19
15.32
0.436
0.790
0.349
New Star Scientists
9.17
24.37
5.46
0.053
0.096
0.043
Employment in Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manuf.
5,529
8,058
4,853
74.145
83.348
71.687
Employment in Pharmaceutical Prep. Manuf.
4,563
5,958
4,191
52.809
52.136
52.990
Employment in Scientific R&D
9,026
18,465
6,655
175.131
199.365
169.043
Salaries in Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manuf.
48,656
52,710
47,329
---Salaries in Pharmaceutical Preparation Manuf.
50,294
51,960
49,631
---Salaries in Scientific R&D
46,420
51,869
44,943
---Establishments in Pharmaceutical & Medicine Manuf.
35.20
67.01
27.02
0.599
0.781
0.552
Establishments in Pharmaceutical Prep. Manuf.
17.89
29.84
14.72
0.298
0.319
0.292
Establishments in Scientific R&D
226.81
513.70
156.84
4.465
5.336
4.252
Number of Patents
78.33
211.78
45.78
1.288
2.090
1.093
Biotech Incentive Dummy
0.081
0.414
0
0.002
0.011
0.000
R&D User Cost
1.175
1.171
1.176
0.059
0.027
0.066
Panel B. Observation Counts
Total Sample
Regression Sample
Variable Name
N
# of states* # of years*
N
# of states # of years
Star Scientists
1071
51
21
1071
51
21
New Star Scientists
1071
51
21
1071
51
21
Employment in Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manuf.
996
47
21
798
38
21
Employment in Pharmaceutical Preparation Manuf.
929
44
21
588
28
21
Employment in Scientific R&D
1046
49
21
987
47
21
Salaries in Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manuf.
693
47
20
618
43
18
Salaries in Pharmaceutical Preparation Manuf.
499
28
20
438
37
18
Salaries in Scientific R&D
900
45
20
670
40
18
Establishments in Pharmaceutical & Medicine Manuf.
1020
51
20
1020
51
20
Establishments in Pharmaceutical Prep. Manuf.
1000
50
20
1000
50
20
Establishments in Scientific R&D
1020
51
20
1020
51
20
Number of Patents
1071
51
21
1071
51
21
Biotech Incentive Dummy
1071
51
21
1071
51
21
R&D User Cost
1071
51
21
1071
51
21
NOTE: * With at least one non-missing observation

Mean (in levels) -- Adopting States Only
Pre-adoption
mean
90.78
26.37
7,211
4,742
20,115
50,264
51,494
42,574
70.55
30.56
546.68
239.12
0.000
1.171

Post-adoption
mean
63.30
18.13
9,257
7,920
16,132
56,904
52,742
67,360
61.46
28.72
462.12
169.62
1.000
1.171

Table 2 The Effect of Incentives on the Number of Star Scientists
1
Panel A – Stars & New Stars
A1 Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost

14.680*
(8.527)
−77.786***
(28.908)

Biotech Incentive * R&D User Cost
A2 Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
Panel B – New Stars
B1 Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
Biotech Incentive * R&D User Cost
B2 Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive

2
Stars

3

632.270*
(356.313)
−62.186**
(25.595)
−531.288*
(301.021)

11.421
(8.072)
−84.113**
(33.011)
100.667
40.158
14.582
11.345
22.303
24.118
New Stars, Extensive Margin
3.037*
(1.758)
−14.027**
(6.474)

141.826**
(70.035)
−10.522*
(6.053)
−119.394**
(59.183)

4

1.905
(1.987)
−18.402**
(7.864)

5
New Stars

6

104.468
(81.742)
−15.812**
(7.403)
−88.230
(68.852)

1.451
(1.926)
−16.290*
(8.583)
26.556
12.248
7.175
5.466
17.300
15.314
New Stars, Intensive Margin
−1.132
(0.847)
−4.375*
(2.531)

−37.358
(36.058)
−5.290**
(2.475)
31.164
(30.418)

2.674
−1.223
(1.843)
(0.974)
R&D User Cost
−2.835
−13.455*
(7.097)
(3.259)
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
20.778
5.778
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
8.959
3.289
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
14.617
12.870
−19.585
−21.161
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
18.029
17.294
15.315
9.924
Sample Period
1990-2010 1992-2011 1990-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 1990-2010
Number of Observations
1071
969
1071
1071
969
1071
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the
0.01 level (two-tailed test). Regressions estimated via OLS. Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with
within-state AR(2) errors. Pre-adoption means are the baseline numbers of star scientist in adopting states in the year before
adoption of incentive or credit. For biotech incentives, the percent effect is defined as the ratio of the coefficient over the
pre-adoption mean, holding constant R&D tax credits. For R&D user cost, is the effect of an increase in R&D tax credits
large enough to lower the R&D user cost by 10 percent (relative to its average among adopting states), holding constant
biotech incentives. Panel A includes all patenters. In Panel B, we define the extensive margin of “new stars” in a given state
in year t as the flow of star patenters who were in a different state in the year t-1, based on year’s t-1 patent(s). Patenters
with patents in multiple states in year t-1 are assigned to a single state based on their modal state. We define the intensive
margin of “new stars” in a given state in year t as the flow of star patenters who were in the same state in year t-1 based on
year’s t-1 patent(s) and did not qualify as “stars” because their 10-year trailing biotech patent count measured in t-1 was not
in the top 5% of all biotech patenters. Sample includes data for 51 states. All models include state fixed effects and year
fixed effects.

Table 3 The Effect of Incentives on the Number of Star Scientists, by Type of Patenter
(1)
Panel A – Individual
A1 Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost

Stars
(2)

13.171*
(7.325)
−61.609**
(23.957)

Biotech Incentive * R&D User Cost
A2 Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
Panel B – Corporate
B1 Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost

16.509
22.217

1.263
(1.309)
−14.800***
(4.770)

Biotech Incentive * R&D User Cost
B2 Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
Panel C – University
C1 Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
Biotech Incentive * R&D User Cost
C2 Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive

7.150
23.293

0.004
(.191)
−2.027*
(1.221)

(3)

(4)

565.095
(305.030)*
−47.669**
(20.883)
−474.798*
(257.737)

2.249
(1.888)
−15.982**
(7.345)

10.806
(6.974)
−66.265**
(27.325)
79.778
31.930
13.545
23.896

9.161
15.994

62.425
(56.429)
−13.255***
(4.422)
−52.615
(47.642)
0.431
(1.238)
−16.334***
(5.524)
17.667
7.316
2.438
353.347
25.709
20.862

0.644
(6.226)
−2.011*
(1.213)
−0.550
(5.299)

New Stars
(5)

119.119
(77.656)
−13.030*
(6.825)
−100.539
(65.490)
1.830
(1.826)
−14.642*
(8.159)
24.556
11.506
7.454
14.653

−0.434
(0.293)
−2.137**
(0.975)

−21.676
23.131
−0.029
(0.057)
−0.624*
(0.368)

(6)

−14.668
(11.781)
−2.497***
(0.968)
12.245
(9.957)
−0.441
(0.322)
−1.500
(1.030)
2.000
1.064
−22.068
16.237

−733.379
27.023
−1.750
(1.746)
−0.667*
(0.368)
1.481
(1.494)

−0.083
−0.054
(0.200)
(0.063)
R&D User Cost
−2.277*
−0.819**
(1.340)
(0.412)
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
3.333
0.222
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
2.056
0.120
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
0.119
−2.502
−13.121
−24.386
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
11.352
12.747
59.720
78.404
Sample Period
1990-2010 1992-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 1990-2010
Number of Observations
1071
969
1071
1071
969
1071
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the
0.01 level (two-tailed test). Regressions estimated via OLS. Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with
within-state AR(2) errors. Pre-adoption means are the baseline numbers of star scientist in adopting states in the year before
adoption of incentive or credit. For biotech incentives, the percent effect is defined as the ratio of the coefficient over the
pre-adoption mean, holding constant R&D tax credits. For R&D user cost, is the effect of an increase in R&D tax credits
large enough to lower the R&D user cost by 10 percent (relative to its average among adopting states), holding constant
biotech incentives. Panel A includes individual patenters. Panel B includes corporate patenters. Panel C includes acdemic
patenters. Sample includes data for 51 states. All models include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.

Table 4 The Effect of Incentives on Employment in Biotech Related Industries
Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing
(3254)
(1)
(3)
Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
Biotech Incentive * R&D User Cost
Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive

1.324**
(0.658)
−8.355**
(3.476)

64.682**
(29.513)
−6.115*
(3.167)
−54.761**
(25.317)

Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing
(325412)
(4)
(5)
(6)
1.796**
(0.740)
−8.793**
(4.402)

47.858*
(27.334)
−6.327
(3.943)
−39.848*
(23.416)

Research & Development in the Physical,
Engineering, and Life Sciences (54171)
(7)
(8)
(9)
3.951***
(1.482)
−5.844
(4.150)

157.398***
(59.433)
−1.801
(3.579)
−132.002***
(50.520)

1.190*
1.741**
4.037**
(0.700)
(0.784)
(1.980)
R&D User Cost
−10.030**
−9.819*
−9.517*
(3.953)
(5.329)
(5.593)
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
8.043
5.792
21.701
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
7.698
6.495
10.611
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
16.456
14.791
31.016
30.062
18.206
18.601
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
12.496
15.003
15.589
17.409
6.341
10.327
Sample Period
1990-2009
1990-2009
1990-2009
1990-2009
1990-2009
1990-2009
1990-2009
1990-2009
1990-2009
Number of States
38
38
38
28
28
28
47
47
47
Number of Observations
798
722
798
588
532
588
987
893
987
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Employment is measured in thousands.
Regressions estimated via OLS. Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with within-state AR(2) errors. For biotech incentives, the percent effect is defined as the ratio of the
coefficient over the pre-adoption mean, holding constant R&D tax credits. For R&D user cost, is the effect of an increase in R&D tax credits large enough to lower the R&D user cost by 10
percent (relative to its average among adopting states), holding constant biotech incentives. All models include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.

Table 5 The Effect of Biotech Incentives on Employment in Other Industries in the Traded Sector
Chemical
Machinery Manufacturing
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
−22.240
−0.098
(18.917)
(1.273)
R&D User Cost
56.965
−1.383
(83.436)
(9.663)
Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive
−17.571
0.487
(22.833)
(1.556)
R&D User Cost
31.212
−1.097
(101.754)
(11.653)
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
368.308
23.735
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
322.756
29.093
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
−6.038
−4.771
−0.415
2.053
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
−2.032
−1.113
0.547
0.434
Sample Period
1990-2009
1990-2009
1990-2009
1990-2009
Number of States
48
48
49
49
Number of Observations
1008
912
1029
931

Computer and Electronic Products
(5)
(6)
−12.825**
(5.386)
22.497
(15.182)
−12.836**
(6.291)
23.770
(18.456)
63.676
40.551
−20.141
−20.158
−6.388
−6.749
1990-2009
1990-2009
49
49
1029
931

Food Manufacturing
(7)
(8)
−2.158***
(0.748)
4.376
(4.085)
−2.410***
(0.659)
3.167
(4.508)
42.436
34.513

−5.084
−1.460
1990-2009
51
1071

−5.679
−1.057
1990-2009
51
969

NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Regressions estimated via OLS.
Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with within-state AR(2) errors. Employment is measured in thousands. For biotech incentives, the percent effect is defined as the ratio of the
coefficient over the pre-adoption mean, holding constant R&D tax credits. For R&D user cost, is the effect of an increase in R&D tax credits large enough to lower the R&D user cost by 10
percent (relative to its average among adopting states), holding constant biotech incentives. Sample includes data for 51 states. All models include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.

Table 6 Triple Difference Estimates
Employment (3254)
(1)
Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive - Biotech Industry
R&D User Cost - Biotech Industry
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
Sample Period
Number of Observations

1.290**
(0.658)
−1.165***
(0.324)
8.043
7.698
16.042
1.742
1990-2009
1595

Employment (325412)
(2)
1.801**
(0.741)
−8.996**
(4.406)
5.792
6.495
31.098
15.950
1990-2009
1176

Employment (54171)
(3)
3.862***
(1.470)
4.447***
(0.837)
21.701
10.611
17.795
−4.826
1990-2009
1973

NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Regressions estimated via OLS.
Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with within-state AR(2) errors. Pre-adoption means are the baseline numbers of star scientists in adopting states in the year before adoption
of incentive or credit. For biotech incentives, the percent effect is defined as the ratio of the coefficient over the pre-adoption mean, holding constant R&D tax credits. Sample includes data for
51 states. All models include indicators for state, year, biotech sector, as well as the interaction of state and biotech, and year and biotech.

Table 7 The Effect of Incentives on Employment in the Non-Traded Sector
Constr
(1)
(2)
Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
36.819**
(14.623)
R&D User Cost
−87.570*
(49.198)
Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive
35.121**
(16.028)
R&D User Cost
−133.096**
(57.853)
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
229.83
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
131.86
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
16.02
15.28
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
7.647
11.623
Sample Period
1990-2009
1990-2009
Number of States
50
50
Number of Observations
1050
950

Retail
(3)

(4)

31.349***
(10.867)
−18.286
(40.324)
32.185***
(11.447)
−43.734
(46.676)
470.79
312.45
6.66
6.84
0.674
1.612
1990-2009
1990-2009
51
51
1071
969

(5)

Real Estate
(6)

5.814***
(2.034)
−5.021
(6.680)
6.098***
(2.324)
−10.560
(7.712)
73.12
40.68
7.95
8.34
1.421
2.989
1990-2009
1990-2009
51
51
1071
969

NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Regressions estimated via OLS.
Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with within-state AR(2) errors. Employment is measured in thousands. For biotech incentives, the percent effect is defined as the
ratio of the coefficient over the pre-adoption mean, holding constant R&D tax credits. For R&D user cost, is the effect of an increase in R&D tax credits large enough to lower the R&D
user cost by 10 percent (relative to its average among adopting states), holding constant biotech incentives. All models include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.

Table 8 The Effect of Incentives on Salaries
Pharmaceutical and Medicine
Manufacturing (3254)
(1)
(2)
Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost

0.001
(0.003)
−0.033**
(0.016)

Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
Sample Period
Number of States
Number of Observations

0.077
0.374
1990-2007
43
618

Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing Research & Development in the Physical,
(325412)
Engineering, and Life Sciences (54171)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.000
(0.004)
−0.034*
(0.020)

−0.001
(0.002)
−0.035**
(0.018)
−0.076
0.401
1990-2007
43
555

0.047
0.392
1990-2007
37
438

0.005*
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.020)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.033
(0.027)
−0.265
0.377
1990-2007
37
395

0.513
0.069
1990-2007
40
670

0.003
(0.003)
−0.008
(0.025)
0.341
0.089
1990-2007
40
590

NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Regressions estimated via OLS.
Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with within-state AR(2) errors. For biotech incentives, the percent effect is defined as the ratio of the coefficient over the pre-adoption
mean, holding constant R&D tax credits. For R&D user cost, is the effect of an increase in R&D tax credits large enough to lower the R&D user cost by 10 percent (relative to its average among
adopting states), holding constant biotech incentives. All models include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.

Table 9 The Effect of Incentives on Number of Establishments
Pharmaceutical and Medicine
Manufacturing (3254)
(1)
(2)
Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
9.102***
(3.319)
R&D User Cost
−9.812
(10.920)
Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive
7.840**
(3.144)
R&D User Cost
−9.663
(11.918)
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
76.78
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
47.08
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
11.86
10.21
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
2.400
2.363
Sample Period
1990-2007
1990-2007
Number of States
51
50
Number of Observations
977
880

Pharmaceutical Preparation
Manufacturing (325412)
(3)
(4)
5.541**
(2.425)
−8.827
(8.961)

113.541**
(45.636)
−333.870***
(120.078)
4.775*
(2.574)
−13.035
(12.964)

35.556
23.260
15.58
4.370
1990-2007
50
955

Research & Development in the Physical,
Engineering, and Life Sciences (54171)
(5)
(6)

13.43
6.453
1990-2007
49
863

105.524**
(47.431)
−405.360***
(142.180)
621.222
281.929
18.28
16.99
13.636
16.556
1990-2007
1990-2007
51
51
1020
918

NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Regressions estimated via OLS.
Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with within-state AR(2) errors. For biotech incentives, the percent effect is defined as the ratio of the coefficient over the pre-adoption
mean, holding constant R&D tax credits. For R&D user cost, is the effect of an increase in R&D tax credits large enough to lower the R&D user cost by 10 percent (relative to its average
among adopting states), holding constant biotech incentives. All models include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.

Table 10 The Effect of Incentives on Patents
Patents
(1)
Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
Cumulative Effects (0-2 years)
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
Sample Period
Number of Observations

(2)

36.469
(30.836)
−275.933**
(114.246)

Patents (Individual)
(3)
(4)
29.276
(21.616)
−192.160**
(79.066)

27.020
(29.990)
−269.134**
(131.251)
262.94
114.11
13.870
10.276
27.844
27.158
1990-2010
1992-2010
1071
969

24.577
(20.999)
−185.172**
(90.765)
183.95
79.53
15.915
13.361
27.821
26.809
1990-2010
1992-2010
1071
969

Patents (Corporate)
(5)
(6)

Patents (University)
(7)
(8)

5.607
(8.388)
−67.667**
(30.795)

1.463
(1.254)
−15.152**
(5.970)
1.400
(8.503)
−70.328**
(35.660)

66.05
31.67
8.488
2.120
24.603
25.570
1990-2010
1992-2010
1071
969

1.030
(1.265)
−13.045**
(6.589)
13.31
6.42
10.993
7.741
27.181
23.402
1990-2010
1992-2010
1071
969

NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Regressions estimated via OLS.
Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with within-state AR(2) errors. For biotech incentives, the percent effect is defined as the ratio of the coefficient over the pre-adoption
mean, holding constant R&D tax credits. For R&D user cost, is the effect of an increase in R&D tax credits large enough to lower the R&D user cost by 10 percent (relative to its average among
adopting states), holding constant biotech incentives. All models include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.

Table 11 Spatial Lag Specifications
New Stars (95th
percentile)
(2)

Pharmaceutical and
Research & Development in the
Medicine Manufacturing Pharmaceutical Preparation Physical, Engineering, and Life
(3254)
Manufacturing (325412)
Sciences (54171)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Stars (95th percentile)
(1)
PANEL A: Spatial Weighting Matrix based on interstate population flows.
Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
13.583
1.712
1.235*
1.769**
3.990***
(8.326)
(1.940)
(0.631)
(0.711)
(1.439)
R&D User Cost
−5.214
−76.110***
−17.774**
−7.538**
−7.959*
(28.760)
(7.821)
(3.606)
(4.471)
(4.059)
Spatial Lag
Biotech Incentive
−3.717
−1.027
−0.459
1.798
−19.147*
(10.079)
(3.034)
(0.900)
(0.918)
(2.346)
R&D User Cost
−244.358
18.356
30.271
−3.494
−111.325*
(19.819)
(22.716)
(33.226)
(215.649)
(62.434)
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
100.667
26.556
8.043
5.792
21.701
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
40.158
12.248
7.698
6.495
10.611
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
13.493
6.446
15.352
30.549
18.387
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
21.823
16.709
11.275
14.111
5.657
Sample Period
1990-2010
1990-2010
1990-2010
1990-2010
1990-2010
Number of States
50
50
37
28
46
Number of Observations
1050
1050
777
588
966
PANEL B: Spatial Weighting Matrix based on inverse-distance between each pair of states.
Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
14.264
1.721
1.245*
1.822**
3.843
(8.948)
(2.100)
(0.669)
(0.740)
(1.511)
R&D User Cost
−5.946
−76.448***
−18.017**
−7.959**
−8.945*
(28.542)
(7.651)
(3.529)
(4.599)
(4.068)
Spatial Lag
Biotech Incentive
−12.415
−6.709
−2.006
0.996
−1.905
(20.250)
(6.294)
(1.527)
(1.412)
(4.544)
R&D User Cost
−252.065
−3.416
0.517
−57.970
−152.247**
(17.642)
(25.051)
(47.213)
(238.878)
(66.725)
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
100.667
26.556
8.043
5.792
21.701
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
40.158
12.248
7.698
6.495
10.611
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
14.169
6.482
15.483
31.462
17.707
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
21.920
16.938
11.905
15.858
6.452
Sample Period
1990-2010
1990-2010
1990-2010
1990-2010
1990-2010
Number of States
50
50
37
28
46
Number of Observations
1050
1050
777
588
966
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). In Panel A, the Spatial Weighting
Matrix is based on interstate population flows. In Panel B, the spatial Weighting Matrix based on inverse-distance between each pair of states.

Appendix Table 1 Description of State Biotech Incentives
State
Year
Maryland
2008 - present
Massachusettes
2009 - present
New Jersey

1996 - present

Arkansas

2003 - present

Colorado
Washington

1999 - present
2004 - present

Maine
Missouri

1997 - present
1999 - 2003

Florida

2002 - present

North Carolina
California

1984 - present
2004 - present

Credit Type
Income Tax Credit for early-stage biotech companies
“Life Sciences Tax Incentive Program”: Investment tax credit, special sales tax exemptions, refundable
research tax credit
“Business Employment Incentive Program” (BEIP). Broad-based grant for job creation, with a lower jobcreation qualifying threshold for biotech and “emerging high technology.” Also provides financial assistance
for companies in these sectors.
JCTC, Sales tax refunds, and R&D Tax credits with higher subsidies for “targetted businesses,” which
consists of: (i) Advanced materials and manufacturing systems; (ii) Agriculture, food and environmental
sciences; (iii) Biotechnology, bioengineering and life sciences; (iv) Information technology; (v)
Transportation logistics; and (vi) Bio-based products.
Biotech Sales and Use Tax Refund
High Tech Business & Organization Credit for R&D Spending, Includes the “Biotechnology & Medical
Device Manufacturing Sales & Use Tax Deferral/Waiver”
Sales tax exemption on machinery, equipment, instruments, and supplies for biotech research
State & local sales or use tax exemption for life sciences companies (which is just slightly broader than the
sales and use tax exemptions available to most manufacturers)
Specialized incentives and tax credits, (more technically, the biomedical industry was re-classified as “highimpact”, so that qualified companies could be eligible for the state’s preexisting capital investment tax credits
and the High Impact Performance Incentive (a JCTC-type program)
Has the North Carolina Biotechnology Center which make low interest loans to biotech start-ups.
California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act, which provides biotech research grants

Appendix Table 2 Estimates Conditional on Region and Division Trends
Region Trends
Biotech
R&D User
Incentive
Cost
Contemporaneous Effects
Stars
13.174
−73.117
(7.663)
(30.817)
New Stars
1.428
−4.673
(.886)
(3.498)
Employment - Pharmaceutical and Medicine
1075.857
-9435.284
Manufacturing (3254)
(565.127)
(3754.774)
Employment - Pharmaceutical Preparation
1353.251
−9473.389
Manufacturing (325412)
(645.549)
(4637.265)
Employment - Research & Development in the
−3510.039
3672.225
Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (54171)
(1363.094)
(4290.760)
Wages - Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing
0.001
−0.030
(3254)
(0.003)
(0.016)
Wages - Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing
0.002
−0.031
(325412)
(0.004)
(0.019)
Wages - Research & Development in the Physical,
−0.001
0.006
Engineering, and Life Sciences (54171)
(0.003)
(0.020)
Establishments - Pharmaceutical and Medicine
−7.425
7.706
Manufacturing (3254)
(2.825)
(11.111)
Establishments - Pharmaceutical Preparation
−10.182
4.385
Manufacturing (325412)
(2.122)
(9.242)
Establishments - Research & Development in the
104.825
−319.254
Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (54171)
(42.757)
(123.663)
Patents
32.862
−256.727
(28.534)
(120.816)

Division Trends
Biotech
R&D User
Incentive
Cost
9.043
(6.524)
1.025
(.753)
432.613
(455.727)
739.146
(544.011)
3252.809
(1219.043)
0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.004)
0.006
(0.003)
5.872
(2.220)
3.011
(1.624)
96.439
(36.592)
20.083
(24.622)

−50.335
(29.934)
−2.238
(3.547)
−8904.278
(3352.449)
−10285.490
(4262.766)
−303.420
(4326.328)
−0.032
(0.016)
−0.033
(0.020)
−0.004
(0.020)
6.548
(12.109)
−11.234
(8.968)
−231.389
(119.521)
−178.617
(115.070)

NOTE: Regressions estimated via OLS. Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with within-state AR(2) errors.
There are 4 Census regions and 9 Census divisions.

Appendix Table 3 R&D Tax Credit Rate Replacing R&D User Cost
Stars
New Stars
(95th percentile)
(95th percentile)

Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
Sample Period
Number of States
Number of Observations

Pharmaceutical and
Medicine Manufacturing
(3254)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Pharmaceutical
Preparation
Manufacturing
(325412)
(4)

14.759*
(8.405)
65.072**
(25.572)
1990-2010
51
1071

1.662*
(0.967)
4.450
(2.927)
1990-2010
51
1071

1.301**
(0.656)
5.993**
(2.997)
1990-2009
38
798

1.758**
(0.738)
6.025
(3.842)
1990-2009
28
588

Research & Development
in the Physical,
Engineering, and Life
Sciences (54171)
(5)
3.928***
(1.479)
3.572
(3.467)
1990-2009
47
987

NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Employment in columns
3-5 is measured in thousands. Regressions estimated via OLS. Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with within-state AR(2) errors.

Appendix Table 4 Effect of Early Adoption on Star Scientists and Employment
Stars
(95th percentile)
(1)
Contemporaneous Effects
Biotech Incentive
R&D User Cost
First4adopters*Incentive
Biotech Incentive
R&D Tax Credit
Pre-Biotech-Incentive-Adoption Mean
Pre-Credit-Adoption Mean
Percent Effect of Biotech Incentives
Percent Effect of R&D User Cost
Sample Period
Number of States
Number of Observations

New Stars
(95th percentile)
(2)

23.987*
(13.285)
−82.554***
(29.979)

3.577
(3.080)
−19.567**
(8.125)

−24.761*
(14.040)
46.141
(40.038)
100.667
40.158
23.828
23.671
1990-2010
51
1071

−4.449
(3.319)
17.031
(12.525)
26.556
12.248
13.469
18.395
1990-2010
51
1071

Pharmaceutical and
Pharmaceutical
Research & Development in
Medicine Manufacturing
Preparation
the Physical, Engineering,
(3254)
Manufacturing (325412) and Life Sciences (54171)
(3)
(4)
(5)
3.036***
(1.004)
−8.621**
(3.450)

3.110***
(1.019)
−8.690**
(4.274)

−3.927***
(1.049)
−10.295*
(5.360)
8.043
7.698
37.743
12.894
1990-2009
38
798

−3.484***
(1.054)
−11.753*
(6.180)
5.792
6.495
53.698
15.406
1990-2009
28
588

6.460***
(2.180)
−6.882
(4.245)
−6.660***
(2.262)
3.899
(4.154)
21.701
10.611
29.771
7.468
1990-2009
47
987

NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). Employment in columns 3-5 is
measured in thousands. Regressions estimated via OLS. Standard errors based on Newey-West VC estimator with within-state AR(2) errors.

